



British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

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1.7 million ex-tapols are being re-registered

The Indonesian authorities have recently stepped up their campaign of vilification and persecution of former political prisoners arrested after Suharto took power in 1965 as members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or the many mass organisations associated with it.

Re-registration of 1.7 million ex-tapols

The Department for the Interior is conducting a nation-wide re-registration of ex-tapols which is said to be for the purpose of deciding whether they should be allowed to vote in the 1987 general elections. The Department's Director-General for Social and Political Affairs, Hari Sugiman, said that "1,700,000 coup participants" are being re-registered. (Imagine having a coup with 1.7 million participants!) He told a commission of the Indonesian parliament (DPR) that according to figures compiled by the regional military commands (Laksusda) in 1982, there were 1,580,894 former prisoners, including convicted prisoners and those (the vast majority) who were detained without trial. Registration conducted by the Interior Minister up to 1985 produced the lower figure of 1,459,107, consisting of 363 'A category' prisoners (tried), 34,718 'B category' prisoners and 1,424,026 'C category' prisoners.

The number of ex-prisoners now being re-registered is however given as 1.7 million, with no explanation offered for yet another jump in numbers. In fact, the figures now being publicised far exceed any figures ever previously admitted by the regime. The government now appears to be saying that well over one and a half million people were arrested in the late 1960s. Although the Interior Department official was clearly referring to "ex-prisoners", it may well be that many classified as 'C category' were never actually arrested.

The well-publicised re-registration has the effect of warning the Indonesian population of this phenomenally large number of "suspects" living in their midst. The re-registration will cost a staggering one billion rupiahs, the equivalent of more than a million dollars, or "an average of Rp 650 per person for the total of 1.7 million coup participants", according to *Jakarta Post*.

Hari Sugiman said the government "has taken preventive measures to avoid concentrations of these former detainees" and it conducts close supervision of their movements, their homes and their work-places. There are regulations in force preventing them from becoming teachers, professors, puppeteers, journalists and writers, and also prohibiting their election on to executive committees of any social organisations so as to "protect these organisations from becoming tools for the spread of communism".

(Sources: *Kompas*, 8 June and *Jakarta Post*, 8 June)

Ex-tapols excluded from indoctrination courses

Brigadier-General Sarwo Edhie, chairman of the state Indoctrination Board (P7) has declared that former PKI political prisoners must not be allowed to take part in Pancasila indoctrination courses (P4) so as to "prevent negative consequences". Sarwo Edhie is renowned as the man who commanded the para-commandos (RPKAD) in 1965 when they were responsible for organising the nation-wide massacres which left about a million alleged PKI members and sympathisers dead. He was appointed head of P7 last year, placing him in charge of the nation's thought-control apparatus.

All ex-tapols are subject to surveillance by the government and the community and continue to be "under guidance", he said. There can be no question of their being allowed to have P4 completion certificates and, moreover, it is "far too risky" to allow them to mingle with other people in P4 courses. He was particularly dismayed that a former tapol, Colonel Djukardi who until his arrest was the mayor of Bandung, had obtained a P4 certificate and had even come top of the class in the course he attended.

Indonesia's ideological suprema admitted that all citizens without exception are required by law to attend P4 courses but "extra vigilance is needed in the case of ex PKI cadres considering their past ideological commitment and their cunning instigation of the community". But he made no attempt to provide a shred of evidence about any "cunning" deeds of the country's former political prisoners.

(Source: *Sinar Harapan*, 29 May.)

Executions may have taken place in East Java

Just as we were going to press, reports were coming in of an execution or executions in East Java. It is feared that Rustomo, one of the three PKI political prisoners under sentence of death, may have been executed on 1 July. A report that Gatot Lestario and Djoko Untung were executed at the same time was also received. We are trying to check these reports.

Two Muslim prisoners, Bambang Sisoyo and Abdullah bin Umar also face "imminent execution" according to the authorities. TAPOL believes that worldwide action is necessary to halt the possibility of a new wave of executions in Indonesia.

The execution of Munir unleashes worldwide protest

The news that the Indonesian trade union leader, Mohammad Munir was executed in May after spending seventeen years (not eighteen years as reported in TAPOL Bulletin No. 69) in prison unleashed a wave of protest in many countries, particularly the Netherlands, France, the UK, West Germany and Australia.

The protests grew in intensity when the Indonesian embassy in Canberra confirmed that three more communist political prisoners were also to be executed. (*Melbourne Age*, 29 May) The day before, Senator Gareth Evans, spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs, had expressed Canberra's deep regret at Munir's execution and urged the Indonesian government to show reason and compassion with respect to other former PKI members awaiting execution.

Dutch public opinion shaken

The sense of outrage at Munir's execution was so strong in the Netherlands that it became the centre of media attention for several weeks. News of the execution came just as Eegje Schoo, Dutch Minister for Overseas Aid was visiting Indonesia, preparing for the 1985 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia which is always hosted and chaired by Holland. Politicians and members of Parliament strongly condemned the execution, forcing the Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers to instruct Mrs Schoo to seek confirmation and an explanation from President Suharto. Suharto confirmed the execution in a meeting with her on 25 May, and in the new wave of protests that followed, many calls were made for the IGGI meeting to be postponed.

After her return, Mrs Schoo was strongly criticised for her lack of efforts to press Jakarta to halt further executions. Virtually all sections of the Dutch press, right across the political spectrum, condemned Munir's execution. In early June, Prime Minister Lubbers addressed a strong appeal to the Indonesian government not to proceed with any more executions.

During the IGGI meeting in Amsterdam on 4-5 June, Mrs Schoo, ignoring appeals from the Dutch Parliament, made no reference in her opening speech to the executions even though Ali Wardhana, head of the Indonesian delegation, felt obliged to state on Dutch TV that he understood the feelings of people in Holland and would convey this to the Indonesian president. The protest demonstration outside the IGGI meeting-place was far larger than in previous years.

Dutch economic and cultural relations with Indonesia also became a hotly disputed topic. Amsterdam City Council which has a twinning agreement with Jakarta, wrote to the governor of Jakarta, General Suprpto, threatening to suspend aid programmes. Similar moves were taken in other cities and universities with links and programmes in Indonesia. Mrs Schoo herself was compelled to postpone the signing of a judicial cooperation agreement with Indonesia.

The generals manoeuvre to safeguard aid

Just four days before the IGGI session began, Jakarta announced through its Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, that it would "seriously consider" any formal Australian request for it to cancel the planned executions of former Indonesian communists. This was the only time Jakarta displayed any sign of responding to pleas on behalf of the threatened men. This can only have been a manoeuvre to safeguard the economic package of \$2.4 billion which the IGGI was about to approve.

Three days after the meeting, Mochtar had changed his tune and told the press that such requests are "an intervention in our internal affairs", a far cry from his earlier promise of "serious consideration." He said that since clemency pleas for the men had been rejected, their

death sentences must be carried out.

Lord Avebury, chairman of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, in a letter to the press (*The Guardian*, 11 June), regretted that nothing effective had been done at the IGGI meeting to stop further executions. "If the subject was mentioned, it must have been in such a mild way that the Indonesians felt that aid would not be affected by any atrocities that they commit." He said the men's lives could only be saved now by the IGGI announcing the suspension of its aid package until there is a definite reprieve.

Munir's last message

TAPOL has received a report about the last hours of Munir's life. The execution in fact took place not on 14 May as we reported last issue but at 3 am on 15 May, on one of the Pulau Seribu islands in the bay of Jakarta. Contrary to what we had been told earlier, he did have a final three-hour meeting with his wife and their two children. Government officials were present throughout the meeting which was filmed while a recording was made of everything that was said.

During the conversation, Munir said:

There's no need to get too unhappy about this as everyone has to die some time. The only difference is that my death is because of ideology. I don't want to force my beliefs on the children who are old enough to think for themselves.

Munir's final words just before his execution were spoken to the doctor who attended the execution.

Please tell all my comrades and everyone else who has shown an interest in me that I accept my death with a sense of relief because this is the risk I took in taking up the struggle. So please don't let it worry or sadden you. Farewell to everyone and my thanks to you, doctor, for all your help up to now.



Demonstration of protest outside IGGI meeting in Amsterdam, 5 July

An apology

This issue is much later than usual for technical reasons. We hope the adoption of new technology will speed up our production process and lower costs. Unfortunately, problems of adjustment took their toll, first time round.

Gatot Lestario and the Blitar affair

The four political prisoners whose death sentences could take place any time are all members of the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Ruslan Widjajasatra was a deputy chairman of the All Indonesia Trade Union Federation, SOBSI, banned together with the PKI when the military came to power in 1965. Gatot Sutaryo (Lestario), Djoko Untung and Rustomo all held leading positions in the PKI's East Java provincial committee.

All four, together with Munir, were arrested in 1968 or 1969 during an army crackdown on a large group of PKI members and sympathisers who tried to make a stand against the Suharto regime in South Blitar, an impoverished and remote region of East Java where support for the PKI was very strong in pre-1965 days. The underground movement established in Blitar was organised by a number of activists who had evaded arrest and survived the massacres carried out at the instigation of the Indonesian army after Suharto came to power.

As one of the condemned men is known to have told the court during his trial several years later, the Blitar movement occurred because the Suharto regime had placed all communists beyond the protection of the law. They became people who could be and were murdered with impunity during the white terror that engulfed the Indonesian countryside after 1965. The communists who survived had no alternative but to defend themselves and try to resist the government.

During the course of 1968, the army's East Java Brawidjaya Division, under its commander Major-General Mohammad Yasin, threw tens of thousands of troops into a military campaign called *Operasi Trisula* to destroy the movement and capture its leaders. A region of about 20 by 70 kilometres was thoroughly searched, bringing great hardship to the local inhabitants. A large number of kampungs were burnt to the ground and their inhabitants forced to live out in the open along the highways. *Srikandi*, a local newspaper, later reported the brutality of the troops and said that some 10,000 people were thought to have been killed during *Operasi Trisula*. The paper was promptly banned. (NRC Handelsblad, 15 June, 1985)

In their efforts to capture Gatot Lestario, the Army arrested his wife, Pudji Aswati and tortured her for information about the whereabouts of her husband, but she told them nothing and was later tried and sentenced to 17 years. No deduction was allowed for the years she spent in detention before her trial. Pudji is now in the women's prison in Malang and is not due for release till 1991. Napsiah, the wife of Djoko Untung, is also in prison in Malang, serving a 20-year sentence.

Although encircled by the army, Gatot and his friends evaded arrest for many months. They were frequently



Djoko Untung



Gatot Lestario

forced to abandon their hiding-places in search of food. Physically weakened from living for months on leaves and cassava, some of the Blitar fugitives including Gatot eventually succeeded in breaking through the encirclement and making their way to Jakarta. Gatot was arrested there six months later.

He was tried six years later along with Djoko Untung and another defendant named Basuki who died while the trial was in progress. They were found guilty of attempting to establish a 'new-style' PKI in place of the party which had been banned by edict of General Suharto in March 1966 after he seized power from President Sukarno.

Gatot's defence

Short fragments of Gatot's defence plea have reached the outside world from prisoners now released who knew him in prison. They say that he delivered an impassioned attack on the Suharto regime and insisted that the Blitar Affair was a direct consequence of the extreme brutality inflicted on the PKI after 1965. He also used the occasion to accuse the regime of systematic torture and maltreatment of tens of thousands of political prisoners.

Gatot and his co-defendants had written to the court before the commencement of the trial, asking to be defended by Yap Thiam Hien, Buyung Nasution and Aryanto, all of them highly respected human rights lawyers. This request was ignored by the court. The team of lawyers appointed by the court was rejected by the defendants who then decided to conduct their own defence. Press reporting of the last days of the trial (see *Indonesian Times*, 8 January 1976 and *Suara Karya*, 9 January 1976) indicate that the court allowed the defendants only one day to prepare their response to the final summing up of the prosecution. With hardly a pause for consideration of the defence plea, the court found both men guilty and sentenced them to death on 9 January 1976.

European Parliament adopts resolutions condemning Indonesia

On 13 June, the European Parliament adopted two resolutions on executions in Indonesia:

I.

The European Parliament,

- a. deploring the execution of the trade union leader Mohammad Munir in Indonesia and the indignation this has caused in Europe,
- b. having learnt of the threat of execution to four other trade union leaders,
- c. having regard to the long delay which has elapsed since the sentence was delivered,
- d. referring to the steps already undertaken by the governments of the Netherlands and Australia and by the

Italian Government on behalf of the Member States of the European Community to persuade the Indonesian authorities to reprieve the three (sic) other persons sentenced to death,

- e. whereas relations between the ASEAN countries, in particular Indonesia, and the Member States of the Community are of vital importance,
- f. having regard to the close cultural and historical links between Indonesia and many European countries,

1. Urges the Indonesian Government to take steps to ensure that the sentence of death on the four trade union leaders is not carried out,

2. Calls on the Foreign Ministers of the ten Member States of the Community meeting in political cooperation to make further representations to the Indonesian Government in order to prevent the impending executions,

3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Indonesian Government, the Commission, the Council and the Foreign Ministers of the Member States.

II.

The European Parliament,

a. dismayed at the news that on 14 May 1985, after keeping Mohammad Munir prisoner for sixteen years, the Indonesian Government executed this opposition politician, a member of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and former Member of Parliament, thereby carrying out the death sentence passed in 1973,

b. having been informed that four more imprisoned opposition politicians and members of the PKI - Ruslan Widjajasatra, Gatot Lestario, Djoko Untung and Rustomo - face impending execution after fifteen years' imprisonment,

c. whereas the death sentence carried out on Mohammad

Munir and those still hanging over Ruslan Widjajasatra, Gatot Lestario, Djoko Untung and Rustomo were imposed because of their political opposition to the military regime which came to power in Indonesian in 1965 by means of a violent coup,

1. Condemns the carrying out of the death sentence on Mohammad Munir as a cold-blooded execution and political murder,
2. Calls on the Commission, the Council, the President of the European Parliament and the governments of the Member States to do their utmost to prevent the remaining death sentences from being carried out, and to do so with all haste in view of the urgency of the situation,
3. Calls on the President of Indonesia to reprieve the opposition politicians condemned to death and to release them,
4. Appeals to world opinion to campaign for the condemned men to be reprieved and released,
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States of the EEC and the President of Indonesia.

Military regime infuriated by European Parliament

Resolutions infuriate Indonesia's military leaders

Never before has Indonesia's military regime responded so angrily to any international condemnation of its human rights violations as it did to the resolutions of the European Parliament condemning the execution of Mohammad Munir and the planned executions of four other PKI leaders.

News of the resolutions reached Jakarta shortly before members of the Indonesian parliament, the DPR, were to visit the European Parliament with parliamentarians from other ASEAN countries. The delegation was led by General Kharis Suhud, a presidentially-appointed MP and vice-chairman of the DPR. Following a meeting with the president, General Suharto, General Kharis Suhud and General Amir Machmud, DPR chairman (also a president's appointee) announced Indonesia would vigorously reject "interference" from the European Parliament.

In the days that followed, a stream of top-level officials - ministers, leading figures in the judiciary, top-line generals, leaders of GOLKAR, and DPR members - joined a chorus of vilification against the European Parliament, filling the front pages of all the leading newspapers, prime-time television newscasts and radio broadcasts. All kinds of abuse was poured on the European MPs, not forgetting of course the charge that they were under communist influence.

The execution of Munir which had originally been a tightly-guarded secret in Indonesia suddenly became headline news. Munir had been executed not because he was part of the political opposition but because he was a rebel who had engaged in criminal acts against the state. Despite all the evidence of bias in the courts and the absence of an independent judiciary, it was claimed that his case had been handled with due process of the law. Yet, it was admitted in several statements, including one by General Kharis Suhud, that the decision to reject his clemency plea was taken because "he remained a diehard to the end", in other words, what mattered was his political stand.

The regime was particularly stung at being called a "military regime which came to power in 1965 by means of a violent coup". This statement could well be the cause of all the fuss for it turns the regime's version of the 1965 events on its head - the coup was the Army's and Suharto's and not anyone else's.

General Ali Said, now chairman of the Supreme Court, who chaired several extraordinary military tribunals which passed down death sentences in the political trials of the late 1960s and early 1970s, reiterated the claim

that Njono, the first man tried, had admitted that the PKI organised the 1965 coup attempt, despite the fact that Njono in court retracted the "confession" he signed under duress during interrogation. (The court's refusal to consider Njono's retraction is an example of the contempt it showed for its own procedures. The verdict admitted that although statements in court must by law supercede statements made under interrogation, the court would ignore Njono's retraction in court because his reason for doing so was "political". Njono was sentenced to death and later executed.)

Human rights report makes matters worse

As if the resolutions were not enough, the European Parliament was also due to consider a draft annual report on human rights abuses worldwide containing a paragraph criticising Indonesian practices in East Timor and West Papua. This gave the puppet governors, Izaak Hindom in West Papua and Mario Carrascalao in East Timor a chance to join the chorus against the European Parliament. The paragraph on Indonesia reads:

The European Parliament... is gravely concerned about...

The policies of repression and terror pursued by the Indonesian authorities in Irian Jaya and East Timor, including massacres by military forces, summary executions, indiscriminate arrest, torture, deaths in detention and abductions; the Indonesian Government has continued to exert pressure on Papua New Guinea for the return of refugees who have fled from Irian Jaya; in addition to the imprisonment of large numbers of alleged secessionists, a number of political prisoners arrested after the coup of 1965 still face the death penalty.

The 'European Parliament affair' became so serious that an emergency meeting of Indonesian ambassadors in all EEC countries was held in Vienna to discuss the 'crisis' with the DPR delegation. The DPR's presence at the dialogue with the European Parliament was a matter of "strategic importance", said DPR member, Rachmat Witular of Golkar. "We also want to inject a spirit of daring into our diplomats by showing them how to stand up to these white-skinned people." (*Sinar Harapan*, 6 July)

The subsequent 'dialogue' in Luxemburg had no effect on the resolutions, and some members of the Parliament's ASEAN region delegation repeated their condemnation of the executions. The point was repeated in the joint statement issued at the end of the 'dialogue'. In plenary session, the Parliament decided to postpone adoption of

the human rights report until November because many amendments had been submitted. This was quite unrelated to the Indonesian delegation's visit, yet the delegation used this to claim a great victory. The resolutions and the report were mixed up and the impression created that the (already-adopted!) resolutions had been postponed.

After the delegation's return home, the press showed an almost obsessional interest in the 'European Parliament affair'. *Sinar Harapan*, for instance, had sent a journalist to Luxemburg to cover the event; political analysts were interviewed to shed light on the European Parliament, its policies, its 'excessive' interest in human rights and its procedures. The Dutch MEP, Mrs Ien van den Heuvel who drafted the Annual Human Rights Report, was interviewed, then castigated in an editorial for 'stubbornly' sticking to her views.

The daily's indefatigable journalist visited other European capitals for more light on the 'affair' and interviewed an Indonesian historian in Paris who has some rather unorthodox views about the 1965 events. Tisnaya Kartasasmita, the son of a general removed from the Army's general staff soon after Suharto took command of the Army, believes there is a 'factor X' which may only be revealed when confidential documents in western countries are made public under the 30-year secrecy rule,

suggesting western complicity. It was wrong to rely on the interpretation of a single historian, he said, in an obvious dig at the Army's official historian, the late Nugroho Notosusanto. "There is need for proper historical research of various hypotheses." (*Sinar Harapan*, 18 July)



How the Indonesian press views the European Parliament. (*Sinar Harapan*, 3 July)

First public statement of Defence of Democracy Groups

A recently-established underground organisation, the Defence of Democracy Groups, has enthusiastically welcomed the European Parliament resolutions on executions in Indonesia and expressed the hope that the Parliament will be able to save the lives of the many political prisoners who are under sentence of death.

In a statement dated 27 June, the organisation said:

"Our Defence of Democracy groups operate underground with no formal platform; nor can we express our people's wishes openly in our own country. Though small and weak, we are the embryo of a great democratic front of the future. We are the living remnants who have survived the hounding, torture, intimidation and pressure of the Suharto military regime. We are living witnesses of the unparalleled brutalities of the Indonesian military regime; even Hitler's generals could have learnt a lot from the brutalities of Indonesia's generals. Our groups therefore have a great interest in restoring democratic rights in our beloved Indonesia, notwithstanding the terrible risks involved."

The organisation consists of communists and non-communists and is not a communist movement in Indonesia, nor is it striving to save the lives of people from only one part of the political spectrum:

"We base ourselves firmly on a sense of justice, convinced that the verdicts passed by Indonesia's subversive courts are unjust and fraudulent. These courts base their verdicts on political considerations. These injustices and show trials are conducted not only against communists but also against students and intellectuals, Muslims, opposition groups; all are victims of the injustices and manipulations of the Indonesian courts. We therefore struggle for and defend democracy, for humanitarianism regardless of political, ethnic or group differences. We enjoy the moral support of organisations and individuals which uphold democracy in Europe, and are intensifying our links with them."

The statement then called upon the members of the European Parliament to put the following questions to the Indonesian parliamentary delegation:

1. Who is responsible for the one and a half million people who were murdered in unspeakably inhuman fashion from 1965 to 1970, in all parts of Indonesia?
2. Who is responsible for the thousands of political prisoners who died as the result of tortures inflicted on them while they were in detention camps?
3. Who is the responsible for the hundreds of thousands of children whose parents were killed or detained for more than a decade in the years from 1965 to 1980?

4. Who is responsible for the humiliating death of Sukarno, first president of the Indonesian Republic, who received no medical treatment during his detention, and who was not permitted to go abroad for treatment even though he desperately needed treatment?

5. Who murdered D.N. Aidit, Nyoto, Sakirman and other PKI leaders? Why has the government never issued any official statement about the unlawful murders of these PKI leaders?

6. Who is responsible for the acts of arson that destroyed shops in Senen Market during the 15 January 1974 affair which were clearly not the responsibility of the students (who organised demonstrations on that day) because the students were in Salemba, 2,000 metres away from Senen Market at the time the fires broke out? Why were fire-engines forbidden to go in and put out the fires? These fires were started by army troops under the command of Captain A.J. Thomas, then Senen military commander, the same man who later maltreated A.S. Fatwa (a Muslim lay preacher) when he was detained by the Jakarta Military Command?

7. Who is responsible for the acts of terror against, and murder of, hundreds of Muslim supporters of the Nadhatul Ulama during the elections in 1971 and 1977?

8. Who is responsible for the hundreds of deaths that occurred during the 1984 Tanjung Priok affair?

9. Who is responsible for tens of thousands of East Timorese who have died or disappeared without trace?

10. Who is responsible for the murder and maltreatment of the people of West Irian (West Papua)?

11. Who is responsible for the mysterious murder of thousands of people thought to be criminals?

12. Are Mohammad Munir and his comrades, and H.R. Dharsono (a retired general) and his comrades who now detained in Salemba Prison more criminal than legal murderers like Kharis Suhud, Amir Machmud and other members of the Indonesian military junta?

The statement ends with the hope that the European Parliament will record a victory for democratic forces against militarism: "We place our hopes in you, the hopes of the ordinary people who are still powerless."

Tanjung Priok trials continue

Courts in various parts of Jakarta as well as in Surabaya and other cities in Java are still busily engaged in trying dozens of people on charges connected with the Tanjung Priok affair last September when a large demonstration was fired on by troops, killing at least 63 people. (See *TAPOL Bulletins*, Nos 67, 68 and 69.) Most are accused of distributing 'illegal' leaflets which set out the true facts of the incident, contradicting the version made public by Armed Forces commander, General Benny Murdani. The first of the so-called 'extremist lecturers' trials began in Jakarta in mid-July.

'Illegal' leaflets trials

Several men have been accused of spreading 'illegal' leaflets. Defendants named **Simpuang Abdul Malik** and **Andri Harto** are said to have distributed a leaflet which said, "Drag General L.B. Murdani to court to account for the Tanjung Priok incident." Another of their 'crimes' is that they conducted discussions about the incident.

'**AM bin Mud'**, also an 'illegal' pamphleteer, is accused of having conducted courses five times on basic Islamic values without having the necessary permission (**Suara Karya**, 26 April). He also allegedly used taped speeches of Amir Biki and Syarifin Moloko given prior to the Tanjung Priok demonstration. Many supporters of the defendant filled the courtroom and the street outside.

A court in Jogjakarta passed a ten-month sentence on **Sudiyanto Slamet**, a student of Gajah Mada University for 'helping create unrest' by accepting an 'illegal' leaflet, photocopying it and giving copies to five friends. Another Jogjakarta defendant, identified only as 'TP', on similar charges, allegedly "committed subversion or spread feelings of hostility towards the Republic and twisted the facts" about the Tanjung Priok incident. (**Berita Yudha**, 8 May).

A court in Jakarta found two high school students, **Agus Sutaryo Kosib** and **Ramli Zulkarnaen Lubis**, guilty of distributing 'illegal' leaflets and sentenced them both to 18 months. A third defendant was acquitted. (This appears to be the only acquittal so far recorded in all the Tanjung Priok trials.)

'Extremist lecturers' go for trial

The latest word in regime **newspeak** is 'extremist lecturer', used for Muslim preachers who refuse to subordinate their faith to Pancasila claptrap. Quite a number of these "undesirables" were arrested after the Tanjung Priok affair, several of whom have now been charged with subversion and inciting the public.

Haji Salim Kadar, 50, and **Yayan Hendrayana**, 35, are held responsible for the 'bloody riots' in Tanjung Priok on 12 September although all the blood was spilt by General Murdani's troops. Kadar is deputy chairman of the Indonesian Mubalighs' Corps, KMI (mubaligh is a lay preacher), while Hendrayana is an associate lecturer at the Indonesian Islamic Missionary Academy (PDTI) as well as being on the KMI executive. The charges against them include "instigating Muslims to denounce Pancasila" and "opposing family planning".

The prosecution intend to present 35 witnesses, including other KMI leaders who are also in detention and could soon face similar charges, including **Mawardi Noor**, KMI deputy-chairman, and **Professor Oesmani al Hamidy**, rector of the PDTI until it was closed soon after the mubalighs were arrested last year.

Two more 'extremist lecturers' due for trial soon are **A.M. Fatwa**, a leading member of the Petition-of-Fifty group, and **Abdul Qadar Djaelani**.

Syafruddin Prawiranegara interrogated for 'extreme' lecture

The Chairman of the KMI, **Syafruddin Prawiranegara**, a well-known politician from pre-1965 days, was summoned for interrogation by the Jakarta Military Command because of a sermon he delivered on Idul Fitri, the end of Ramadhan fasting month. Major-General **Try Sutrisno** who commands the Jakarta garrison has threatened to prosecute Syafruddin and another lay preacher, **Latief Amir**. (**Sinar**

Harapan, 26 June)

Syafruddin Prawiranegara, who held a number of ministerial positions in the 1950s and headed the Republican government in West Sumatra when the President and other ministers were under arrest by the Dutch in 1948, spoke to a crowd of more than 2,000 in the region of Tanjung Priok, and said that Indonesia "is covered by a thick, black fog" because of fear. The treatment of those who stand accused in connection with the Tanjung Priok affair and the subsequent bombings has reinforced the sense of fear "gripping ordinary people, in particular the Muslim **ummah**", he said. (**Tempo**, 6 July)

More trials in East Java

Five trials are to be conducted in Malang, East Java. The first defendants, **Murdjoko** and **Andi Sukisno**, appeared in court in early August, charged with undermining the



Murdjoko and Andi Sukisno

at the Brawijaya University in Malang. Their cases are allegedly linked to the other three cases shortly to be tried in Malang concerning various bombing incidents in East Java earlier this year.

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Jogjakarta Muslim publication banned

A Muslim youth publication, **Al Ichwan**, was banned by order of the Attorney General on 28 May for publishing material "that could cause social unrest". The journal is published by an organisation of mosque youth in the Central Java city of Jogjakarta and is said to be the same in format and style as a journal called **Ar Risalah** which was banned three years ago "for promoting Islamic revolution and attacking the state ideology of Pancasila".

The journal's editors are being interrogated while the chief editor (who is not identified by name) is under arrest. (**Jakarta Post**, 5 July)

Long-term Muslim tapols on trial

A large number of Muslim political prisoners have come up for trial in courts throughout Java in the past few months. In addition to the people facing charges in connection with the Tanjung Priok affair last September, many of the defendants are on trial for political activities in the late 1970s, from 1977 or 1978 up to 1981. They are all alleged to have engaged in activities in opposition to the Pancasila and to have sought to 'undermine or overthrow the lawful government'.

The longterm prisoner trials

These trials are taking place in Bandung, Jogjakarta and several East Java towns, including Jember and Bojonegoro. The charges allege that the defendants were members of a so-called 'Komando Jihad' (Holy War Command). This term is used freely by the regime against the Muslim dissidents of the late 1970s, without producing any evidence that such a Command existed. The term conveniently serves the government's purposes by creating the impression that Muslim political opponents are all 'terrorists'. 'Komando Jihad' has become the generic term for Muslim dissidents in much the same way that 'G30S' (the alleged 30 September 1965 coup attempt) was used as the generic term for communist political prisoners after 1965. Muslim dissidents are the 'extremists of the right' and the PKI opponents the 'extremists of the left' which General Yoga Sugomo, head of BAKIN, the central intelligence agency, never tires of talking about.

The men now on trial were part of a political upsurge that followed the 1977 general elections when the Muslim party (the PPP) made an impressive showing in some regions, while numerous cases of intimidation and vote-rigging were exposed, and dozens, possibly even hundreds, of people were arrested or killed. In March 1978, the upper legislative chamber, the MPR, drew up a programme for the compulsory, nationwide indoctrination of the Pancasila philosophy, despite opposition from Muslims inside and outside the PPP.

We don't try political criminals



General Ali Said

General Ali Said, Chairman of the Supreme Court has recently claimed that "Indonesia has never brought to court or given a death sentence to people involved in political crimes." He went on to say: "We do not try ideology. We try the subversive activities committed by people... If these people turn out to be also involved in political crimes, it (is) merely a coincidence." (Jakarta Post, 26 July)

By the early 1980s, it was known that several hundred Muslims were under detention but little was known at the time about their whereabouts or the charges against them. It was not long before they sank into obscurity with virtually no international interest being shown in their fate. In 1981, there occurred a series of events which seemed designed to stigmatise Muslim activities as 'terrorists'. The most notable was the hijack of a Garuda plane which was the result of Army intelligence penetration of a Muslim congregation based in Bandung. Two murders in Jogjakarta and Solo were immediately linked with so-called 'Komando Jihad' people though the information published about the victims were highly suspect. One, for example, was said to have been a 'PKI agent' without any proof that this was true.

Another 'terrorist' group was associated with the name of Warman who was shot dead in 1981. His activities were

said to be located in West Java.

However, Muslim unrest was undoubtedly the most widespread in East Java where traditional Islam, identified with the Nahdatul Ulama party, the largest component in the PPP, has pursued a line of accommodation with the government, much to the dissatisfaction of many Muslim communities. Virtually nothing was heard abroad about political unrest in the province at the time, but in the early 1980s, death-squads operated in the region, killing hundreds of victims officially said to be 'bromocorah' or village bandits. In fact, most of the victims were informal Muslim leaders. The Muslim unrest and the subsequent killings were soon smothered in a blanket of silence.

The present upsurge in Muslim unrest has caused the regime to revive public interest in this earlier generation of Muslim political dissidents - the 'right-wing extremists' - by conducting a series of trials in which Muslims are depicted as 'murderers', 'bandits' or 'Komando Jihad' terrorists.

The trials

Reporting on these trials in the national press has been sketchy and irregular, with hardly any information being provided on the arguments of the defence. Local newspapers have probably devoted more space to the trials, but are rarely available overseas. As *Indonesia Reports* (May Log, No 8, June 1985) remarks, "close examination of these proceedings would almost certainly reveal more about endemic devout Muslim dissent than the Bank Central Asia bombing cases".

In February this year, the authorities announced that 11 persons were to be tried in Bandung, 4 in connection with Tanjung Priok and 7 in connection with the 'Warman Terror Gang'. In May, one of the seven, **Ondang Sudrajat** was sentenced to 9 years and the prosecution in the case of **Djaja Budi Rahardja** demanded a sentence of 12 years. The five others being tried are **Aep Saeful Bachtiar**, **Mahamad Sodikin**, **Toha Mahfud**, **Ules Sujai** and **Aceng Kurnia**. (*Berita Yudha*, 27 May 1985)

In East Java, five people have already been given heavy sentences, all by the Bojonegoro District Court. They are: **Idris**, 15 years; **Rasmin Anshori**, 10 years; **Muslich**, 8 years; **Shodig**, 7 years; and **Oardjani** 5 years. At the time these sentences were announced, two others were awaiting sentence, while other trials were being conducted in Probolinggo and Lumajang.

Nine Muslim prisoners have been on trial in Jember, East Java all of whom, like the men already convicted in Bojonegoro, are described as 'Komando Jihad' activists. (*Sinar Harapan*, 21 May)

Two death sentences in Jogjakarta

Trials held at Sleman District Court, Jogjakarta have already produced two death sentences. **Abdullah bin Umar**, a teacher of religion from Flores was sentenced to life imprisonment last February. On appeal to the High Court, the sentence was increased to death. The available press report of the High Court appeal does not explain who lodged the appeal. It could have been lodged by the prosecution (entitled under Indonesian law to appeal against a sentence) who had demanded the death sentence during Abdullah's trial.

He was charged with subversion for alleged acts of 'terror' and undermining government authority by trying to replace Pancasila with Islam. He was said to have held meetings with an Islamic congregation at a mosque in

Pakem and 'absorbed' 100 members of other congregations in Central Java and Jogjakarta. He was accused of being 'commander' of the Central Java 'Komando Jihad' and of being involved in the murders of Parmanto, rector of the Solo state university, and a student at the Islamic Institute in Jogjakarta named Hasan Bauw, an alleged defector within the group. (This suggests that Bauw could have been an agent-provocateur from army intelligence).

Typical of Indonesian press reporting, *Sinar Harapan* (25 January) gave details of the prosecution's case but only reported that the defence denied all the charges and rejected all the testimony of the witnesses, without supplying any details.

The second defendant to be sentenced to death is **Bambang Sispoyo**. The charges against him were much the same as those against Abdullah bin Umar. Throughout his trial at the Sleman District Court, the accused man refused to participate in the proceedings. At every hearing, he ignored the presiding judge's order to sit down and was ordered from the court-room each time. On one occasion, reports *Tempo*, (18 May), he flung a five-thousand rupiah note at the judges, a cynical reminder of the ease with which 'justice' is available... at a price.

Death sentences could be carried out soon?

Within a month of Bambang Sispoyo's verdict and the High Court verdict against Abdullah bin Umar, the chief judge of the Jogjakarta High Court announced that the two men had refused to exercise their rights of appeal. They could therefore be executed at any time, he said.

A third man tried in Jogjakarta for alleged 'Komando Jihad' activities is **Muhammad Sudiatmo**, former student at

the Islamic University. He was sentenced to 18 years; the prosecution had demanded death.



Timzar Zubil in court, after being sentenced to death. (*Tempo*, 29 June, 1985)

Timzar Zubil's death sentence to be reviewed?

Timzar Zubil, a Muslim journalist and activist who was sentenced to death for subversion in 1978, has not yet been executed, and is still under detention in Medan. In early 1982, it was reported that a clemency plea made on his behalf had been turned down by President Suharto and that his execution was therefore 'imminent'.

After several years of silence, *Tempo* now reports (29 June) that there is a slight chance his sentence will be reviewed. A lawyer who is under detention together with him has petitioned on his behalf, arguing that the judge who presided over his trial was in error not to inform the defendant in time of his right of appeal. It has yet to be decided whether the Supreme Court will agree to a review, though according to one official of the Court, the chances of this happening are minimal.

Careless words can land you in jail

'Watch your words' must be on many people's minds as they see more and more people dragged before the courts for 'insulting the government'. Take, for example, the teacher of religion from a village in Central Java who is being charged in court for remarks he made when testifying at a land dispute hearing recently. **Sumarhadi**, 37, was testifying about the compensation paid and was asked whether he knew about development projects in the village. Yes, he did. And where had the cash for these projects come from? For all he knew, he answered, they could have come from theft or assault. The implications of this 'slip of the tongue' were not lost on the authorities.

"As a government employee and member of KORPRI (the association which all government employees must join), you know very well that development in Indonesia is financed by the government", declared the judge when Sumarhadi later found himself in the dock. All the defendant could say when confronted by such overwhelming evidence was that it had not been his intention to insult the government. Indeed, he had retracted the offending words long ago...

His lawyer argued that people cannot be charged for remarks they make when testifying in a lawcourt, still less when they subsequently retract. But the prosecutor would have none of this. The words were spoken in a public place and "could arouse feelings of hatred towards the government among the people attending the hearing." Ah well, with luck, Sumarhadi will get away with a lenient sentence...

(Source: *Tempo*, 15 June 1985)

'Mu' (25) made his slip of the tongue - a 'discourteous' remark about President Suharto - among people he regarded as friends, his fellow-students at the Faculty of Technology, Gajah Mada University, Jogjakarta. One of his 'friends' made a report to the military, so now 'Mu' is up for 'insult'.

He was arrested on 9 March by the military command in Temanggung, Central Java, who first heard of the 'crime', and after being interrogated, he was passed on to the military command in Jogjakarta, then to the police there. (Actually only the police are entitled under existing procedures to arrest and interrogate suspects.) His trial started on 11 June after he had been in detention three months. (*Sinar Harapan*, 12 June)

* * * * *

'AMS' should surely have known better for he is apparently a security guard at Freeport mine in Irian Jaya. He had the effrontery to scrawl the names of Indonesia's president and vice-president and lots more people besides on a wall, writing after each name the word 'monkey' (monyet), adding that Darwin had proven that human beings are descendants of the ape. There were plenty of witnesses to testify that the words had appeared, hardly necessary though, since 'AMS' made no effort to deny it.

The trial, reports *Sinar Harapan* (18 March), proceeded in 'marathon' session because the defendant had already spent 188 days in detention without trial, getting close to the 200 days allowed by law. According to the prosecutor, this 'crime' is well worth 18 months behind bars. We haven't yet heard what the judges thought.

Nationwide social engineering through the family planning programme

Driving the East Timorese to Extinction

Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopes, Bishop of Dili until May 1983, warned recently that unless the sweeping birth control programme now being conducted in East Timor is halted, "the East Timorese people as they were known may no longer exist". In a letter to President Reagan on the occasion of his visit to Lisbon in May, the former Bishop stressed that East Timor "has always been an underpopulated area and with the huge loss of life resulting from the Indonesian invasion, is even more so today." The programme is being directed at virtually all women of child-bearing age, he wrote, and the Indonesian authorities are distributing birth control devices that have been banned in western countries because they are harmful or can cause infertility.

Only a few days before Mgr da Costa Lopes wrote in such strong terms to the US president, the Indonesian authorities in East Timor moved towards more systematic implementation of their birth control programme with the opening of a two-storey birth control centre in Dili. The World Bank is deeply involved in the programme and provided more than 95 percent of the funds needed to finance the new headquarters - altogether Rp. 616,923,147 out of a total of Rp 648,080,000. (*Berita Yudha*, 26 April, 1985)

Mario Carrascalao, puppet governor of East Timor, who is throwing his full weight behind the campaign, has described birth control as "decisive" for resolving East Timor's population problem. He complained that the programme was not proceeding well "because the people of East Timor are mostly Catholics and are very simple-minded". But there has been a breakthrough recently, he claimed, because the present head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, Mgr Ximenes Filipe Belo has issued a statement accepting the programme "as long as no force is involved." If Mgr Belo has indeed been prevailed upon to issue such a statement, in conflict with Catholic doctrine, it only reflects the pressures under which he now operates. For as his predecessor, Mgr da Costa Lopes said in his message to President Reagan, the Church "is staunchly opposed to such anti-life activities".

Making way for the transmigrants

There is clear evidence that birth control is being imposed on people living in regions that have been targeted for large-scale transmigration. East Timor is one striking example of the combination of these two programmes which is integral to Jakarta's security objective of replacing a rebellious population with one loyal to the state. But other areas are affected too.

The combination of the two programmes was publicly emphasised in a government-sponsored rally of youth in South Kalimantan when the youth were called upon to practise birth control for the sake of making way for a large-scale influx of transmigrants. The provincial governor told the rally that South Kalimantan has been designated a transmigration region, "and there is therefore no alternative - it must reduce the rate of population growth". (*Sinar Harapan*, 30 May 1985) The province is scheduled to receive 35,000 transmigrant families during the current five-year plan or an additional 175,000 people.

The rally was said to "represent" the youth of the province, and according to the *Sinar Harapan* report, when Haryono Suyono, director of Indonesia's national family planning institute, the BKKBN, asked the crowd, "Are you willing to restrain yourselves by not getting married early?" the people responded in unison, "Yes, we are!"

Sinar Harapan was doubtful of the need for such a campaign for it referred to South Kalimantan as "a huge, fertile region (with) a population of only 2.2 million (which) is capable of sustaining many more, yet the

younger generation has been obliged to give this pledge."

Ideological commitment from the youth and the women

The BKKBN chairman has recently announced that the birth control programme is now to concentrate far more heavily on creating ideological commitment because of the high rate of "drop-outs". (He uses the English expression.) He said people must be persuaded to accept a new norm, the "small, happy family" norm. The younger generation will be the main target of this new campaign because, in the newspeak of Indonesia's family planners, the "300,000 to 500,000 thousand 'fertile-age' couples 'retiring' each year (as they cease to be fertile) are replaced by 700,000 new 'fertile-age' couples who cannot be expected to practice birth control because they have only just got married". (*Kompas*, 30 May, 1985)

Efforts to "intensify the role of women" are of strategic importance to the success of the programme, he said. He blamed the high rate of "drop-outs" on women so many of whom are "unhappy about staying in the scheme. The high rate of 'drop-outs' is caused not by contraceptives proving unsatisfactory but by a lack of commitment to the 'small, happy family' norm". The new norm is now being popularised by the acronym, NKKBS (*norma keluarga kecil bahagia sejahtera*).

This new emphasis can only place even greater strains on women in Indonesia who have for years borne the brunt of the country's heavy-handed birth control programme. One writer, Fanny Carmila, recently described the programme as "sexist in the extreme". Over 90 percent of couples practising birth control use female contraceptives, whilst from 1974 to 1981, there were five times as many women sterilised as men even though vasectomies were introduced ahead of tubectomies and are easier operations to perform, and less risky. She writes:


Amid all the clatter about humanitarianism and the slogans extolling the defence of human rights, women have lost the right to control their own bodies... In pursuit of political and economic objectives, the status of women has been so degraded that they are treated like cattle who can be told when to produce children and 'castrated' when they are no longer required to do so. (*Sinar Harapan*, 29 June 1985)



Haryono Suyono, head of Indonesia's Family Planning Institute, looks on as a woman claims that "practising birth control made it possible for her to go to Mecca". (Some Muslim preachers now on trial are being charged with opposing the official "family planning programme".)

Photo: *Sinar Harapan*, 22 July.

EAST TIMOR

Guerilla activities
January - February 1985

Source : Radio MAUBERE, June 23rd, 1985

Radio contact with Fretilin re-established

After a gap of nearly seven years, Fretilin re-established two-way radio communication with the outside world in May this year.

The re-establishment of two-way radio contact between Fretilin forces inside East Timor and Australian support groups now organised in the Australian Coalition for East Timor (ACET) has made East Timor's line of communication with the outside world incomparably shorter. It is also a sign of the strength of resistance inside the country, for it is no mean task to have smuggled a transmitter in, to operate it and to prevent it from falling into enemy hands.

The two-way radio link was first made public on 26 May when a group of Australian politicians and journalists 'went bush' near Darwin to take part in two-way conversations, an exchange of messages and interviews with Fretilin deputy leader Mau Huu Karatailanu. Australian unionist Brian Manning first picked up the Fretilin call-sign on 6 January after patiently monitoring the frequency at a given time each week for six months. The next stage was to start making the link two-way by operating a transmitter on Australian soil.



Listening to the voice of Fretilin, somewhere near Darwin.

The launch in May was widely reported in the Australian press with most papers welcoming this breach of the Indonesian blockade which has for years prevented direct contact with East Timor.

The authorities in Jakarta were furious, leaping from denials that such a link could possibly exist to calls for a clamp-down Australia. General Murdani doubted that the link existed at all but in the same breath hinted that the transmitter used by Fretilin might have reached East Timor by plane, and he then threatened to shoot down planes that tried again to

breach 'Indonesian air space'. Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja accused "Australian Labour Party members" (presumably the MPs who took part in the launch as well as members of the ACET) of being "irresponsible" and called on the Australian government to take action against them. *Jakarta Post* (1 June) Indonesia's ambassador in Canberra asked the Australian government "to halt the radio contact by all the means at its disposal" *Kompas* (1 June)

The *Jakarta Post* (30 May), clearly expressing the official view, accused Fretilin's "misguided" supporters in Australia of engaging in activities "which grossly violate Indonesia's sovereignty and could possibly lead to threats to our national security".

Canberra refuses licence

Soon after the link was made public, the ACET submitted an application to the Federal Minister for Communications for a licence to operate a transmitter. Under new legislation, the maximum fine for operating an 'illegal' transmitter has been increased tenfold to A\$10,000. On 17 July, Canberra announced that the application had been rejected on the grounds that such a licence would require

Indonesia's agreement "and the Department of Foreign Affairs had advised that Indonesia would not agree". *Financial Review*, (18 July)

Fretilin leader invites Amnesty to visit East Timor

In a transmission to Darwin on 16 June, the commander-in-chief of Fretilin's armed forces, Xanana called upon Amnesty International to visit East Timor, and urged the Australian government to support such an independent fact-finding mission. He appealed to Amnesty to do what it could to shed light on the real situation in East Timor. It should send a mission, he said, "to inspect the prisons, the camps, the regions controlled by Fretilin and to witness the trials of East Timor detainees."

He also gave details of the repercussions of a meeting between Bill Morrison who led an Australian parliamentary delegation to East Timor in July 1983 and a group of Fretilin guerrillas on the road near the concentration camp in Saelari. (The guerrillas had invited the Australian delegation to visit the camp and meet Fretilin members who were gathered there in to welcome the Australians. After returning to Dili, Bill Morrison made no attempt to take up this offer. Morrison was recently appointed Australian ambassador to Indonesia.)

The Australian government must not just send another Bill Morrison and selected journalists to speak to the executioners. It must (push) for the Indonesian government to allow (in) really independent observers, for example Amnesty International.

Xanana said that a few days after the Australians left East Timor, Concio de Sousa Gama who led the group that flagged Morrison's car down was arrested in Saelari together with his colleagues. They were tortured and had since disappeared. The Fretilin leader did not know if they had been killed or deported. (*The Age*, 17 June)

Let East Timor Speak Emergency Fund

Re-establishment of radio contact with the resistance in East Timor has already cost over A\$8,000: for radio transceivers and a receiver, plus other costs. All labour is voluntary and costs kept to a minimum, but A\$10,000 is needed to repay debts and keep going. Send donations to: Let East Timor Speak Fund, PO Box A716, Sydney South, NSW 2000, Australia.

"Fast justice" in Dili courts

A first glimpse of the "justice" dished out to Fretilin political prisoners has come from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (8 August), in an article by its correspondent, Lincoln Kaye who visited East Timor in July.

All the defence lawyers are appointed by the state and brought to Dili from Nusatenggara Timur. Defence lawyers told the *Review* that all the defendants appearing ("100 or so", no-one seems to know the exact number) have pleaded guilty. "Guilty pleas mean a saving of time, defence attorneys explained. The prosecutor simply establishes the circumstances of the alleged crime and the defence seeks only to lighten the sentence." In other words, no defence!

The defence attorneys who said they spend "months and months in Dili on these hearings all at state expense" go on: "What more proof could you ask of the government's seriousness about wanting to provide these defendants with a fair trial?" What more indeed, especially as the *Review* comments about a hearing its correspondent was apparently able to attend that "the witness seems as much on trial as the defendant".

The Dili show-trials are clearly even more blatant travesties than other trials in Indonesian courts, excepting possibly those held in Jayapura.

Declaration on behalf of East Timor

Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, announced on 3 June that the following Declaration won the support of 411 parliamentarians from 13 countries. (The total later rose to 427.)

Recognising that the territory of East Timor has been illegally occupied by Indonesia since December 1975, inflicting extreme loss of life and destruction;

Recognising that the Indonesian policy to isolate East Timor prevents the ICRC and other relief and development agencies from reaching those in need, and denies the international community opportunities to assess the wishes of the people independently;

Condemning the human rights violations committed since 1975, as reported by Church leaders in East Timor and by independent human rights organisations;

Recognising that the East Timorese have been denied their right to self-determination;

Welcoming, finally, UN General Assembly Resolution 37/30 which asked the UN Secretary General "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem", and acknowledging the steps which have been taken to bring Portugal and Indonesia into negotiations;

WE AFFIRM that negotiations will not lead to a just settlement unless they:

1. Involve representatives of the East Timorese people including those who resist the present occupation;
2. Secure an end to hostilities which prevent the people of East Timor and their representatives from contributing freely to negotiations leading to self-determination;
3. Provide internationally acceptable conditions of

access to relief and development agencies and to independent visitors, journalists and diplomats;

4. Include an act of self-determination which is free from interference and verified by international observers acceptable to the East Timorese people.

We commend all international initiatives which observe these principles, and will call upon our government to support actively a process of negotiation conducted on such terms.

* * *

Parliamentarians who signed the Declaration were from the following countries: Australia 43, Denmark 47, France 21, West Germany 17, Ireland 13, Japan 12, Netherlands 20, New Zealand 14, Norway 4, Portugal 94, Spain 59, Sweden 24, United Kingdom 43. Sixteen members of the European Parliament also signed. In all countries, the signatories came from a range of different political parties.

On 24 June, Christians in Solidarity with East Timor, Australia, announced that the Declaration had been endorsed by 104 church organisations from Asia, the Pacific and Australia, among them 35 Protestant and Catholic groups from Asia, 53 from Australia and 16 from the Pacific. They comprise religious orders, lay organisations, Uniting Church presbyteries, and a number of official bodies such as the Japanese, Hong Kong and New Zealand Catholic Commissions for Justice and Peace, the Protestant National Christian Council of Japan and the Pacific Council of Churches.

Asian churches' calm shattered by East Timor

The Eighth Assembly of the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) - regional body of the World Council of Churches - was brought starkly face to face with the reality of East Timor by the distribution of a newsletter on East Timor and the presence at the Assembly meeting, held in Seoul, of East Timorese Catholic priest, Father Francisco Fernandes from Australia. Until now, the CCA has evaded consideration of the issue under pressure from the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI), the largest of its regional members, which persists in claiming that East Timor is an 'internal' Indonesian affair.

The newsletter which infuriated the Indonesian delegation was circulated by the CCA Youth Forum. Besides reproducing a cartoon commenting bitterly on CCA delegates' neglect of East Timor, it reported widespread support among churches in the region for a declaration condemning Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. (This is the declaration reproduced on page which was also supported by more than 400 parliamentarians.)

Although the newsletter was not an official document of the Assembly, the Indonesian delegation demanded its "withdrawal" which was eventually agreed by a four to one majority. But the question of East Timor was still to haunt the Assembly.

The next day, delegates entered the hall to find an announcement pinned to the crucifix on the platform inviting delegates to an informal lunchtime lecture by Father Fernandes. Infuriated, the Indonesian delegation demanding the removal of the announcement. This too was agreed though the lecture went ahead before a very large audience. The next day, Indonesia's churchmen and women had cause to protest yet again when the text of Father Fernandes' lecture was distributed to all the delegates.

As the leader of the Indonesian delegation, Eka Darmaputera, relates the story (*Sinar Harapan*, 17 July),

this was the final straw. Although their various protests had got majority support in the Assembly, the PGI delegation announced that it "had had enough" and had decided not to participate in CCA decision-making for the next five years and not to take up its seat on the CCA General Committee. Darmaputera draws the conclusion that the CCA has fallen under the influence of "radical youths and feminists" and is dominated by "leftist political thought".

E. Timor women get a hearing in Nairobi

Three East Timorese women from Australia, Emilia Pires, Ines de Almeida and Mimi Ferreira held a well-attended workshop on East Timor at the Women's NGO conference in Nairobi. A large Indonesian women's delegation, including two senior (male) Army officers, tried to discredit the Timorese women and claimed that East Timor should not be discussed. When the Timorese women supported by members of the audience, including Moluccan women, firmly attacked Indonesia, the Indonesian delegation walked out.

While the workshop was in progress, persons attached to the Indonesian delegation busied themselves taking photographs of everyone present.



From the CCA Youth Forum Newsletter

Parts of East Timor 'rocked by fighting' says AFP

Journalists from the *New York Times*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Asiaweek* and *AFP* were allowed to visit East Timor early in July, accompanied by Haryo Saputro, editor-in-chief of the Golkar daily, *Suara Karya*.

While their reports provide no insights into the living conditions of the East Timorese people and rely almost without exception on information supplied by Indonesian military officers and Timorese officials in the Indonesian administration, they leave the reader in no doubt that the war is still going on. They report that up to 200 Indonesian troops have died in fighting this year. According to AFP's Jacques Guillon, parts of the country are still "rocked by sporadic fighting". He said there were 84 fresh graves dated from 1 January to 3 July, 1985 in the Dili cemetery, 74 of them Muslim. While Governor Carrascalao claimed these were graves of civil servants as well as soldiers, "other civilian and religious sources disagreed". Barbara Crossette of the *New York Times* reports that most of the tombstones bore the word 'gugur' which means 'killed in action'.

But these figures are only part of the story because the journalists were not allowed to visit Baucau in view of recent military action there, and thus did not inspect any military cemetery in the eastern sector where the resistance is far stronger. Besides, the bodies of dead officers are not buried in East Timor but are taken back to Indonesia.

Asiaweek's Andree Feillard quotes military sources as saying that up to 30 Indonesian soldiers are killed every month. In the eastern zone, she writes, "only road links and towns and surrounding areas are considered under full (Indonesian) control. Villagers define the rest as a risk zone." (*Asiaweek*, 2 August)

Successful Fretilin ambush in June

In a rare breach of the silence that always surrounds

military operations in East Timor, several foreign news agencies reported from Jakarta on 1 July that a force of up to 200 Fretilin guerrillas recently ambushed an army unit in the north-eastern sector. Reports circulating among diplomats put Indonesia's casualties at up to 35. This could well have been in the vicinity of Baucau, and the reason that put this major Army and Air base out of bounds to the visiting journalists.

Only a week before the report of this ambush appeared on the wire services, General Murdani was claiming in the *Armed Forces* daily, *Angkatan Bersenjata* (24 June) that "Indonesian security forces have scaled down their operations in East Timor as disturbances by Fretilin forces have virtually ceased". (Quoted in *Courier Mail*, 25 June)



General Murdani brings end-of-Ramadhan "festive" greetings to the troops in East Timor. Extreme left, Governor Carrascalao. (*Jakarta Post*, 24 June)

Indonesia's concentration camps

During an interview with Mark Aarons of the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, the leader of Fretilin, gave the following description of the concentration camps or strategic villages where most East Timorese now live:

* * *

A concentration camp is a concentration of people living in houses or huts in a restricted area. The inhabitants are only allowed to move round freely within the camp, and only during daytime. The camps are usually built along the roads; there are none in the towns.

Collaborators, members of *hansip* (civil guard) and traditional leaders live in houses with galvanised iron roofs while the Maubere (Timorese) people live in huts made of grass or palm leaves in the central part of the camp. Some of the iron-roof houses are inhabited by Indonesian army officers and police, and by *nanggala* butchers (para-commandos). Behind the houses and huts are gardens. Before August 1983, gardens were situated up to a thousand or fifteen hundred metres from the camps. Today they go only up to 500 metres away and in some zones, no more than 300 metres.

There are control posts for night-watch every 50 metres round the camps; at the ends of the vegetable gardens, there are special control posts for day-watch. Every evening at 5 pm, all the available men must go to the control posts and surrounding areas to guard the camps. If all the men are in jail or have been forced to go on operations with the enemy, the women have to go instead. The purpose of the day-watch is to make sure that people working in the gardens stay inside the restricted areas. During night-watch from 5 pm till 6 am, tins, drums or bamboo sticks are banged every hour to keep the people on duty from falling asleep.

During periods of tension, people are not allowed to move about, even to go to their vegetable gardens; these restrictions can last for a month or more. They must attend roll-call every morning and evening. The houses are frequently searched at night. During normal times, people can, on the slightest pretext, be refused permission to travel anywhere outside their camp and sometimes can't even go to their gardens. Sometimes, people are ordered to harvest crops before they are ripe because a new period of 'rigorous prevention' is about to begin. Everyone travelling from one camp or village to another must have a *surat jalan* (travel pass). Sometimes people not in possession of a pass are beaten up or killed if discovered climbing over the fences surrounding the vegetable gardens to gather fire-wood.

Many have been refused permission to leave their village, and in certain periods, all permits to visit Dili are suspended. At other times, only two or three may leave but not till they have explained why they are going and who they will be working for.

When hunger is particularly severe, villagers are allowed to go to the bush once every 15 days with a 'group pass'. These groups include collaborators and they are under escort of territorial troops.

There are control posts at the entrance to every village, with *nanggala* troops on duty. They search everyone entering or leaving - men, women and children. Soldiers also keep watch over the shops and ask people; Why did you buy this? Why do you need this amount? Who is it for?

More refugees arrive in PNG

Despite all the exertions of the Indonesian government to repatriate the many thousands of West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea, little more than 200 have returned in the past six months. At the same time, there has been a huge influx of newcomers following reports of intensified military operations against the OPM independence movement, in the north-east of Irian Jaya (West Papua) as well as in the interior. Adding a new dimension to the exodus, five refugees from Merauke have made their way by canoe to Australia's Thursday island, north of Queensland.

2,000 more refugees cross or are waiting to cross the border

According to the *Sydney Morning Herald* (2 July), some two thousand West Papuans have recently crossed over into Papua New Guinea or are about to cross over.

More than five hundred are waiting to cross up near the northern corner of West Sepik province, just south of the border town of Wutung. News about these refugees was first made public by Father John Etheridge, Bishop of Vanimo (*The Age*, 23 June) after receiving information that 560 Papuans had left their homes and were taking refuge in an OPM camp. He had been asked for help with medicine, food and clothes, but said he could not help as long as they remain on Indonesian soil. Quoting a letter from the OPM, Bishop Etheridge said that some had walked a long way from the interior. They were afraid of the Indonesians and many had died from Indonesian actions.

The other 1,500 Papuans have already crossed into PNG near the Yapsie river which is situated just north of the central mountain range, some 250 kilometres south of Wutung. This is an area not affected by the large-scale crossings of refugees during 1984. The nearest refugee camps are about 125 kilometres south, in Tarabits and Kungim, or 100 kilometres north, in Green River.

In June, military operations were launched against the OPM by 200 PNG Defence Force troops, apparently in coordination with operations launched on the other side

of the border by a far larger contingent of Indonesian troops. The first PNG operations were directed against an OPM camp in Skotiau, west of Bewani. Two weeks later, PNG troops continued their anti-OPM operations, this time, incredibly, on the Indonesian side of the border about five miles west of Wutung. Although nothing has appeared in the press about the Indonesian operations, TAPOL understands that some 3,000 troops were involved.

These coordinated actions followed discussions held between PNG and Indonesian officials at a meeting of the Border Liaison Committee early in May. *Nugini News* (13 May) strongly condemned the joint military operations in an editorial entitled, "Let Jakarta fight its own war". It wrote:

We appear to be ready to do Jakarta's bidding by trapping (the OPM) in a pincer movement on the border. If they stand and fight, some of our soldiers may be killed. If they flee, the Indonesians are said to be waiting in their thousands to mop them up. One can only speculate on the likely reaction of 10,000 Irian Jayan refugees and the OPM's many sympathisers here.

PNG's participation in operations against the OPM would appear to be the price Port Moresby has to pay to convince Jakarta that it will not give sanctuary to OPM guerillas or sympathisers. Whatever the PNG government imagines it is achieving in clamping down on OPM activities, the operations can only exacerbate the refugee problem.

Returned refugees and deportees face retaliation

Information is coming to light about Indonesian persecution of West Papuans who have returned voluntarily or been handed back by the PNG authorities.

There is no doubt that despite all the exertions of both Indonesian and PNG governments, the number of refugees returning has been nothing more than a trickle. Figures given by different sources vary. Indonesian media reports give a total of 223 who returned in three groups: 99 in December 1984, 58 in May and 66 in June 1985. (See for example *Kompas*, 13 June) A letter from a West Papuan refugee in Telefomin gives a higher total of 255: 155 in December, and two groups of 50 in May and June. The strategem of removing the more vocal refugees from Blackwara camp in March (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 69, May 1985, page 17) to prevent them from "influencing" others not to repatriate seems to have had no effect at all.

In addition to the repatriation of refugees, the PNG authorities have also deported a number of OPM fighters, with dreadful consequences.

Three deported OPM men feared dead

Sifting through a number of reports received about the fate of eight OPM members deported to Indonesia in December, TAPOL believes that three died within a week of their return, as a result of treatment at the hands of the military. The eight forcibly repatriated men were: Mathias Offide (24), Musa Offide (21), Keliopas Offide (22), Onesimus Indey (25), Manuel Abisai (24), Nixon Abisai (20), Jehezkiel Klofle-Srikadifat (21) and Christofel Misiren (30).

These eight surrendered to the PNG authorities on 13 December following an attack on the OPM headquarters, Markas Victoria, somewhere in the northeast corner of Irian Jaya. They were tried by the Vanimo district court five days later for illegal entry but were acquitted and

should have then been allowed to enter the Blackwara refugee camp near Vanimo. However, they remained under police custody and were deported to Indonesia on 22 December together with the Blackwara camp refugees who were repatriated on that day.

According to a report from OPM sources dated 3 May 1985, two of the eight men, Christofel Misiren and Jehezkiel Klofle were singled out and taken for questioning to divisional military headquarters in Jayapura (Laksusda/Kodam XVII). The others were allowed to return to their kampungs. During interrogation, Christofel was brutally beaten, and a blow at his head proved fatal. He was taken to Dok-II General Hospital and died there on 23 December. Jehezkiel Klofle was also subjected to both physical and mental maltreatment. He died at home on 23 December from an injury to the neck inflicted during interrogation. The other six had been taken to Aryoka Hospital before returning home; while there, they were given injections. On 28 December, Nixon Abisai had a sudden fit and died instantly. The next day, Keliopas Offide also had a fit but survived, thanks to immediate treatment. When Nixon Abisai's body was examined at Dok-II General Hospital, poisonous fluids were discovered. The other five were then given antidotes to save them from the same fate. (These events suggest that while the military use hospital facilities for lethal purposes, the staff there can and do apply proper medical treatment to protect the victims.)

The whereabouts of Misiren and Klofle were later investigated by two refugees from camps in PNG who were allowed to accompany the group of repatriants sent back to Jayapura in May 1985. These two had gone as 'witnesses' of the repatriation. After returning to PNG, they toured the camps to tell other refugees what they

saw and heard. Their inquiries about Christofel Misiren led them to conclude that "he had been battered to death by Indonesian soldiers at his place of detention", according to a report of their visit to Telefomin camp, a copy of which has been sent to TAPOL. They were told that Jehexkiel Klofle was "still around", and a man said to be Klofle was presented to them. "When we met him and asked him some questions, he was not able to say much and seemed very nervous (*gugup*)."

They came to the conclusion that the man they met was not Klofle but someone else.

Indonesian denials raise doubts

The fate of the eight OPM who were deported to Indonesia in December became the subject of repeated denials in the Indonesian press. Initially, the PNG paper, *Niugini News* reported on 14 March that all eight had died as the result of poisonous injections and on 29 March, it reported that news of these men's fate had led other refugees to change their minds about being repatriated.

On 30 March, the Jakarta daily, *Sinar Harapan* claimed that its reporter had met three of the eight men, Manuel Abisay, Keliofas Opide and Heskial Klafle (names as spelt by SH) who confirmed that the other five were alive and well. Although the three men had "asked to be photographed", no photo was produced. On 12 April, the paper again claimed that all eight men were still alive. This second report said nothing more than the earlier news item, except that this time a photograph of the three men was produced. Why was the photo not published with the earlier report? What proof is there that the photo was taken by the SH journalist, that it was not a photo taken under quite different circumstances?

Another Indonesian denial was reported four weeks later when the Indonesian ambassador in Port Moresby, Brigadier-General Iman Supomo, visited several parts of the Indonesian border region. He claimed he met all the eight men and was photographed with them, accompanied by the Catholic missionary looking after them. (*Angkatan Bersenjata*, 14 May) Strangely enough however, according to *Indonesia Reports* (No 8, June 1985) which monitors the major PNG newspapers as well as the Indonesian press, the ambassador has never produced any such photo. If he has one, he would surely have released it to the PNG press as proof that the men are still alive.

Refugee witnesses report several disappearances

The refugees who witnessed the repatriation of refugees in May 1985 (see above) have since spoken of their fears that three of the men who returned from Blackwara camp have disappeared. The three men are **Lingginus Fatagor**, **Dominggus Mesas** and **Karel Fatagor**. A report of the witnesses' visit to Telefomin refugee camp states that, besides attending the ceremony held in Jayapura when the refugees arrived, they also visited Arso-Waris, home of the 155 refugees who returned last December. Refugees living in Telefomin record that when they asked the two witnesses about the fate of the earlier returnees, "they were very cautious in their explanations".


They said that each family was given Rp. 100,000 by the Indonesians before returning to their villages. On their visit to Arso, the witnesses said they met all the repatriated refugees except the above three. They were told by fellow-villagers that Lingginus Fatagor had been sent to Jakarta "to serve a prison sentence". No-one could say anything about the whereabouts of either Dominggus Mesas or Karel Fatagor.

The OPM report dated 3 May referred to above describes the men as leaders of the Arso community and says that all three were killed on 27 December.

Four more OPM men deported to Indonesia

Four men captured during PNG Defence Force operations against the OPM earlier this year were deported to Indonesia on or about 26 June. (*PNG Times*, 7 July) They were taken to Jayapura by air, handcuffed and escorted by PNG police and Foreign Affairs officials. On arrival, they were handed over to armed Indonesian soldiers and immediately taken into custody.

According to a report received by TAPOL from Vanimo, the four men, **Nabot Wanma**, **Ones Serontouw**, **Isaak Waromi** and **Ibrahim Hamong** (or Abraham Hamon) were part of a group of 13 men captured during the PNG operations. After their capture, they were sentenced by a PNG district court and served their sentences in Wewak Prison. Deportation followed soon after. In Jayapura, they were all held in police custody but after a week, Nabot Wanma was transferred to a military prison. All men have been subjected to kicks and beatings and given electric shocks under interrogation. The other nine men of the group are understood to be still in Wewak.



Some of the fifty refugees who returned in May, looking far from happy, on their arrival in Jayapura (*Jakarta Post*, 24 May)

Military operations take heavy toll in the highlands

More than five hundred villagers have been killed in villages in the highlands of West Papua, east of the Wissel Lakes, during the course of June and July this year, according to an OPM report received recently in Vanimo. The details are as follows:

* Three villages were surrounded and burnt down by troops in the sub-district of Kamopa on 4 June. Forty died during the attack.

* Four more villages in the same sub-district were attacked and burnt on 12 June, killing another 17 people.

* On 20 June, the Army killed 120 people in Mayubai village and 100 people in Beoga village, both in the sub-district of Ilaga.

* On 24 June, another 115 people were killed in the villages of Iwandoga and Kugapa, in the sub-district of Sinak.

* On 30 June, 100 people were killed in the village of Agadide, sub-district of Komopa.

* On 2 July, 10 people were killed in Epomani village in

the sub-district of Obamo.


* On 6 July, 15 people were killed in Ikebo village in the sub-district of Bomamani.

An earlier report, received by TAPOL in May, indicated that large-scale Indonesian military operations were launched in the interior after two Menadonese workers were killed during OPM operations near Enarotali. According to this source, 200 village homes were burnt down by Indonesian troops.

These two reports, coming from very different sources, signify that guerilla activity by the OPM and military operations by the Indonesian Army are under way not only in the border regions but also in the interior. Some of the 560 West Papuans known to be waiting to cross the border as refugees are believed to have walked a long way, from the interior. It could be that they are fleeing from the escalating level of Indonesian operations under way in the highlands.

Five refugees refused asylum in Australia

Five West Papuans who live in the vicinity of Merauke on the southeast coast of Irian Jaya who made their way in a perilous journey to the Australian islands in the Torres Strait have been refused permanent asylum in Australia.



One of the refugees on Thursday Island. (PNG Times, 21 July)

They first landed on Boigu island, which is just four kilometres off the PNG coast in June and were taken to Thursday Island, off the northern tip of Queensland, where they soon became the focus of a flurry of government activity.

After intense pressure from Jakarta, the Australian government rejected their request for permanent residence because, according to Immigration Minister, Chris Hurford, Australia does not want to "become a home for Indonesian dissidents or economic refugees (or) exercise a 'draw effect' on people in the PNG camps, and intended to maintain good relations with the Indonesian government". (National Times, 19 July) It is noteworthy that the Minister argues in a letter to the National Times (26 July-1 August) that Canberra's apprehensions about the 'draw effect' are well-founded as "hundreds and

possibly thousands" would seek asylum if a precedent were sent, a clear admission that large numbers of Papuans are desperate to leave their country, given the chance.

The Canberra rejection means that if the men are recognised by the UN High Commission for Refugees as refugees, a third country willing to accept them will have to be found. Australia has closed its doors to Papuan refugees despite the fact that thousands of political refugees from Vietnam, Chile, Poland and the USSR have resettled there. "The only feature which distinguishes the five..." said the Australian West Papua Association, "is that they come from Indonesia, a country

Australia seems determined to placate without regard to the needs of the ordinary people."

An Australian lawyer, Bernard Collaery, an expert in immigration law, is acting as the men's legal counsel. He has called for an investigation to determine whether the Canberra rejection breaches Australian law. (This is not unlike the court case of Bernard Narokobi currently under way in Papua New Guinea.) Having interviewed the men intensively for three days, he believes the men are "the first wave of a genuine refugee crisis on Australia's doorstep." (The Age, 30 July) His reference to an organised, secret movement of Melanesians into PNG's Western Province could lead the Indonesian military to carry out new operations in the district of Merauke.

Cultural genocide

Based on his discussions with the men, Collaery was convinced Indonesia was indulging in "cultural genocide no different from what happened in Germany in the 1930s". Although they were not high profile activists they had all endured imprisonment and maltreatment over a period of months. According to Collaery,

Their political activity didn't go further than keeping a blue and white flag, the resistance flag, which they used in their fight for independence from the Dutch, and the chanting of songs. They all claim not to have participated in violent acts against the Indonesians or their collaborators. They are men of peace. They carried a tattered Bible with them in the jungle for three months.

Collaery says that all the men bore scars and marks from being beaten and 'twisted' or needled with sticks. One said he was bayoneted in the thigh and leg by an Indonesian soldier while in a cell and had received no medical attention.

Daily killings in Merauke jail

One of the refugees told journalists that he left Merauke secretly last September with dozens of people because of growing tension over government land seizures for transmigrant sites. "They have turned Merauke into a place of daily death." Soldiers arrest and beat up anyone who resists land seizures and put them in prison, he went on.

They began to put hundreds of my friends in the jail in the middle of Merauke. Almost every day a man would be shot in his cell by the army as a warning to others not to try to run away. Their bodies would be buried beside the public cemetery... They treat us like second-class citizens. They persecute us. (Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July)

Book reviews

Olle Tourquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia*. Zed Books, London 1984

During the past two decades, Marxist writing on the Third World has suffered a loss of credibility. Theories of underdevelopment, neocolonialism and a host of different ideas about revolutionary struggle have failed to account for the durability of conservative systems in Third World countries. Olle Tourquist's book faces up squarely to this failure, and he puts forward ways in which Marxists can revitalise their approach through his assessment of the course of Indonesian politics up to 1965 and in particular the dramatic rise and decline of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

The book is uncompromisingly Marxist with its emphasis on economic and class issues and the strategic preoccupations of the party. The assumption is that, whatever its mistakes, the PKI could have found an appropriate strategy for gaining power consistent with Marxist theory. But in no way should this deter the non-Marxist reader. The book is consistently stimulating in the originality of its approach, and the author carefully puts the theoretical presuppositions of the PKI into the context of the volatile political climate in which it functioned. It is a thorough and meticulously documented piece of research and an important

contribution to our understanding of the destruction of the left in Indonesia.

The PKI almost completely disappeared after its collapse in 1965 and it has never acquired the exemplary status of more successful communist parties. Olle Tourquist insists however that the PKI should be a prime example of what can go wrong with an apparently successful progressive or revolutionary movement.

The book is divided into many small chapters, a number of which are devoted to summing up the strategic alternatives available to the PKI. The author's main concern throughout is to show how the party responded to the twists and turns of Indonesian politics under Sukarno and how its analysis of Indonesian society was able to strengthen its position. Most compelling is the way we are allowed to view the dilemmas facing the PKI at particular stages or over particular issues, literally as though we are looking at Indonesian politics through PKI eyes.


The first section of the book is a condensed history of the application of Marxist theory to the Third World which gives the reader an idea of the ideological background that informed the PKI's decision making. The last section runs in detail through the limitations of Leninist, Stalinist and Maoist analyses of revolutionary situations in the Third World, with reference to the situation in Indonesia. The author criticises in particular the PKI's failure to understand the nature of Indonesia's capitalist class and suggests an unusual and very well constructed alternative of how capitalism develops in post-colonial societies which will do much to revive Marxist approaches to contemporary Third World issues. As a coherent explanation of events in Indonesia up to 1965 however the book is limited by its style, which tends to cite causes in generalised Marxist terminology, simply referring the reader to other works dealing with events in more detail.

Dilemmas of Third World Communism certainly fills a gap in a somewhat tired historiography of this subject, but it is most illuminating for those who are already familiar with the period. There are still crucial factors in the failure of the PKI that are not allowed for in this book. Both orthodox and modernist Muslims in Indonesia were implacably opposed to the idea of the PKI becoming the dominant party, and it is difficult to see, given the range of their influence in Indonesia, how notions of

class conflict could have resolved the problems they posed to the PKI. The position of the army which also defied class analysis and which conspired to undermine democracy and the position of the PKI, needs much more thorough analysis. Finally, perhaps a detailed exposition of the organisation of the party is needed to explain the problems it had promoting class struggle in the 1960s, and the peculiar contradiction of it being at one and the same time an elite party in the Leninist party and a mass party as well.

Many of the book's strengths and weaknesses lie in its Marxist foundation. For instance, the author has undertaken one of the most impressive accounts of class conflicts in the Javanese countryside I have yet seen. In addition, he has given an excellent glossary of terminology describing complex economic relationships inside Javanese villages. But his emphasis on control of the agricultural surplus as the basis of class conflict misses out the crucial factor of land concentration not through ownership but through an intricate pattern of control by the village elite. But the care and thoroughness with which this book has been put together gives the author's hypothesis great conviction. It is wholeheartedly recommended as one of the best pieces of Marxist writing on the Third World in recent years.

Jonathan Head




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UK agrees on transfer of technology to Indonesia

Collaboration between Britain and the Indonesian military regime will greatly intensify as the result of a wide-ranging agreement on technological co-operation signed between the two governments during a visit to London in July by Indonesia's Minister for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie.

Habibie who also heads Indonesia's aircraft industry, Nurtanio, and all other major companies in Indonesia's fast-growing military-industrial complex, was accompanied on his London visit by General Surono, Minister-Coordinator for Political, Defence and Security Affairs. Signing the accord for Britain were the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Norman Tebbit and Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Richard Luce.

The agreement, which follows discussions held during Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to Indonesia in April, covers co-operation in transportation, bio-technology, electronics, natural resource utilisation, mining, industrial technology, post-harvest handling, scientific information and other fields. The two governments also agreed to provide wider opportunities for co-operation between research organisations, universities and business

enterprises. (Jakarta Post, 18 July).

The Financial Times (8 July) described Habibie as "a key element in the battle for lucrative civil and military sales to Indonesia". The paper believes that, because of difficulties over Indonesian purchases of American fighter planes, British Aerospace is hopeful of winning contracts for its new generation of Hawk 200 fighters. (Indonesia has already purchased several squadrons of Hawk ground-attack aircraft.)

Britain's arms manufacturers also hope to win contracts for the Sea Eagle advanced weapon system in addition to more Rapier missiles, and to conclude a 'collaborative venture deal' with Alvis to manufacture 600 Scorpion tanks in Indonesia, and possibly too to win more orders for naval vessels. Habibie visited Alvis, Vosper-Thornycroft shipyards and other war-weapon industries while in the UK.

The paper comments that the willingness of British companies to share technological secrets with their Indonesian counterparts is crucial to the success of future sales. The agreement signed in London is certainly intended to pave the way for this.

Societies bill becomes law

A new Societies Law giving the State extensive powers to regulate and manipulate all forms of social organisation was unanimously adopted by Parliament (DPR) on 31 May. The Law requires all organisations to accept the state ideology, Pancasila as their sole principle (*azas tunggal*) and grants the Executive extensive powers to control, suspend and dissolve organisations for "disturbing security and public order". All financial assistance from abroad must have government consent, and organisations will be required to fuse to ensure that each sector of social activity is served by no more than one organisation. (See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 64, July 1984 for details of the draft.)

The regime's intentions to assume far greater control over organised political and social activity first became clear in Suharto's 16 August 1982 state address when he declared that "all social and political forces, particularly the political parties that still use other ideologies, must now adopt the Pancasila as their only ideology." He complained bitterly that during the general elections campaign in May, many GOLKAR rallies were disrupted by groups from the other two parties permitted to participate in the election, notably by supporters of the Muslim party, PPP which still had a huge following in some parts of the country. In other words, the regime would now make sure that the political parties would never again be allowed to rally their followers around ideological banners such as the sacred Ka'bah stone which the PPP adopted as its election symbol. Although such incidents had no impact on the political situation, they undermined the regime's claim to enjoy the support of the population.

When the upper legislative chamber (MPR) formalised Suharto's instruction at its March 1983 session, the regime now demanded that all social organisations too must adopt Pancasila as their sole principle and "should be stabilised and regulated" so as to ensure that they play their proper role "in promoting national development". When the draft Societies Law was made public last year, it soon became clear that its purpose was not merely to subject all organisations to government

supervision but to use them as tools to regulate and pacify society as a whole.

Religious-based organisations

All the main religious organisations were dismayed at the possible consequences of the new legislation, among them the Ulama Council (MUI), the Catholic Bishops' Conference (MAWI) and the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI). It was patently preposterous to expect ideological conformity and acceptance of the Pancasila from organisations whose very existence is dedicated to promoting a specific set of beliefs.

Leading members of each of these organisations insisted publicly that they should be excluded from the provisions of the bill. It is a sad comment on the state of social responsibility that, in face of such an overwhelming threat to the right to organise, none of these bodies went beyond defending their own right to exist and did nothing to challenge the bill in its entirety.

Although it appeared at times that the regime might offer concessions to these religious bodies, the bill as finally adopted makes no allowances for their special claims. The chief GOLKAR spokesman, General Suhardiman who steered the bill through the DPR would only say that the way these organisations would have to comply with the new law will be laid down in a governmental decree.

Another ominous sign for religious organisations was the unsuccessful attempt by the PPP to introduce a clause safeguarding the right to religious freedom. It wanted to amend the bill's title to include 'places of worship' and incorporate an amendment protecting mosques and churches from the regulations affecting social organisations. However, the government was not prepared to forego its right to interfere in activities within holy precincts, which is where the regime is most likely to encounter political challenges. The only 'concession' to fears about religious freedom was a new clause stating that Pancasila would not assume the status of a religion.

Government supervision and manipulation

The repressive clauses of the bill will affect a wide



Indonesia's military elite

range of organisations as yet outside government control. These include many youth and student organisations, some professional associations, a whole range of single-issue groups concerned with legal aid and human rights, the environment and consumer-protection as well as village-based community development projects. The bill gives the Executive unrestricted powers to exercise 'guidance' (*pembinaan*) over all societies, requiring them not only to comply with the Pancasila as interpreted by the government but also to merge with other organisations so as to ensure that each sectional interest is served by only one organisation. Experience has shown that forced mergers facilitate government interference and provoke internal conflicts, paralysing an organisation's ability to function properly.

Although the law allows a two-year period of transition during which organisations must fall in line, the government's 'pembinaan' powers have already been used by Abdul Gafur, the Minister of Youth Affairs to prevent any youth or student organisation from holding a congress unless it first promises to adopt Pancasila as its sole principle. The Minister was infuriated when the Islamic Students' Union (HMI) 1984 congress refused to adopt Pancasila in advance of the enactment of the Societies Law. Since then, no congresses have taken place and some student organisations have been disrupted by branches taking pre-emptive decisions to adopt Pancasila, claiming with government encouragement to speak on behalf of the organisation as a whole. A number of organisations, including the HMI, are now deeply divided by such moves.

The bill empowers the government to dissolve any organisation which "undermines national security". Strenuous efforts were made, notably by the Legal Aid Institution, to limit these powers by proposing that dissolution should be a matter for the Judiciary, not the

Executive. With a judiciary so heavily committed to defending government policies, this could hardly give much protection, yet here too no concessions of substance were granted. The only 'concession' was a new clause stipulating that the opinion of the Supreme Court should be sought before an organisation is disbanded. The chairman of the Supreme Court, General Ali Said, must be laughing at the thought that his heavily-militarised team of judges will leap to the defence of any organisation out of favour with the regime.

Pancasila totalitarianism

With the Societies Law now on the statute books, Indonesia's particular brand of totalitarianism known as 'Pancasila Democracy' has acquired new weapons of repression. So finally, a word about the regime's chosen ideology, the Pancasila or Five Principles. What do they mean in practice? The principle, 'belief in One God' does not uphold religious freedom for only five officially-sanctioned religions are permitted - Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. It excludes atheism and outlaws many 'non-recognised' religions and numerous systems of traditional beliefs. The principle of 'national unity' is used by the regime to demand conformity with its objectives of safeguarding national stability and not endangering national security. The sanctions for undermining these objectives are laid down in the draconian anti-subversion law. The principle of 'consensus through consultation' is simply a framework for outlawing social dispute and conflict, shielding the regime from dissent. 'Humanitarianism' and 'social justice' mean nothing to a population confronted with injustice and gross inequalities and denied the right to defend itself.

The reorganisation of the Indonesian armed forces

Part II

(The first part, which dealt with the re-organisation of the Army, appeared in TAPOL Bulletin no. 69, May 1985.)

In July this year, the top brass of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) held its annual RAPIM (Rapat Pimpinan or Leadership Meeting), formerly known as "Commanders' Call". ABRI's annual meeting and the annual meeting of provincial governors, most of them military men, are the two major events in the political calendar when the country's military leaders adopt key decisions setting the pattern for the coming twelve months. This year's RAPIM, held as ABRI's re-organisation was in full swing, was of particular importance.

General Suharto used the occasion to reiterate the importance of ABRI's "oneness with the people" (*kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat*), a convenient euphemism for ABRI's *Dwifungsi* (Dual Function) which is the cornerstone of military rule.

Jobs for the boys

This year's RAPIM took decisions about the social and political role of ABRI's *dwifungsi* (dual function) and the social welfare of ABRI's 'extended family' (*keluarga besar ABRI*) which extends to the wives and families of the troops, and retired officers and men. Murdani and Rudini have both repeatedly given public assurances that the re-organisation will not entail widespread redundancies, a sure sign that many complaints are being voiced in the Army. In any case, lower ranks are required to retire at 45, still able-bodied and potentially dangerous, trigger-happy men if they fail to get reasonably well-paid jobs.

In order to absorb these men, the regime intends to channel many into new areas of activity: guarding the prisons and the forests. The announcement by Minister of Justice, General Ismael Saleh, that retired soldiers would immediately occupy 10,000 job vacancies as prison guards, rising to 30,000 in the near future, came soon

after a number of spectacular prison breaks. The escape of 32 prisoners from Jakarta's Salemba Prison had all the hallmarks of official connivance, fuelling the belief that it was intended to expose the civilian-run prison service as grossly incompetent and ripe for replacement.

The proposal that retired soldiers should be appointed as forest rangers came from President Suharto himself. Until now the forestry police service has been strictly civilian and, moreover, forbidden from carrying weapons following a regulation introduced by Admiral Sudomo when he was still commander of Kopkamtib requiring all non-military personnel to hand their weapons in to the authorities. The forests represent an added security risk because of their potential as locations for guerrilla activity. According to General Surono, Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, to whom it fell to implement Suharto's edict, the new-style Forest Rangers Corps will be coordinated directed by his ministerial sector, placing it firmly within ABRI's orbit.

Caring for ABRI's 'extended family'

This is the activity which has been used since the birth of the Army to justify ABRI's role as entrepreneur in charge of businesses for the purpose of accumulating 'social welfare funds' for the troops. These 'non-budgetary' funds are spent not only on troop welfare but on military supplies including weapons, as well as lining the pockets of those in charge. Companies, cooperatives and foundations run by divisions and commands exist by the hundred, operating airlines, imports and exports, forestry exploitation, insurance schemes, supplying Army uniforms and boots and a great deal else besides. This system of special funding means that expenditure on ABRI is far in excess of the amount which appears in the State budget.

After General Rudini was appointed Army Chief-of-

Continued on page 20

Staff in 1983, he launched Operasi Kartika to clean up and centralise all these business activities. Rudini's 'clean-up' resulted in the dismissal of 24 senior officers for mismanagement and corruption. But far more crucial was his announcement, prior to the RAPIM meeting, that a new company, PT Tri Ubaya Bhakti (PT Truba) has been set up, of which he is the sole share-holder, to manage and control all these business ventures. Rudini told *Sinar Harapan*, (11 May 1985) that under the new company, the funds involved will increase "drastically", boasting that they could be boosted tenfold.

The Police

The only force whose structure will remain largely intact under the present re-organisation is the Police Force, with 17 regional forces and an expansion in personnel from 140,000 to 170,000 men by 1988. ABRI commander General Benny Murdani and the Chief of Police, General Anton Soedjarwo both recognise that a larger police force is needed because "social conflicts are bound to occur everywhere" (*Kompas*, 18 June).

The role of the Police in maintaining security and order is apparently to be given far greater emphasis. Until now, the Police, itself a force riddled with graft, has occupied a subordinate role with hardly any real authority to fight corruption and organised crime, much of it protected or instigated by members of the Army. Even traffic policemen have always shunned 'confrontations' with soldiers who commit speeding or other road offences.

The only period when the Police enjoyed a degree of independence was in the 1950s and early 1960s when Sukarno needed to foster political power bases to counter-balance the Army and appointed men loyal to him to run the Force. Under the 1969 re-organisation of ABRI,

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Fire destroys Radio Republik Indonesia

After months of relative calm, Indonesia was again hit by a wave of disastrous fires in June and July. This time, rural targets were affected as well as important city buildings. Although the authorities refuse to admit that the fires may have been deliberately started, there have been calls for investigations to determine the political implications of the unexplained series of fires.

The most damaging fire, politically, was the one that completely gutted the headquarters of **Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI)**, in the centre of Jakarta on 20 July. RRI is the regime's most effective propaganda weapon.

Ten days before the RRI fire, the Metro Building, a new ten-storey shopping complex in Pasar Baru, Jakarta was also completely destroyed by fire. During June, tens of thousands of hectares of plantations were razed to the ground in North and West Sumatra, and in Aceh.

General (retired) Suhardiman, deputy leader of Golkar's parliamentary group was the most vocal about the possible political implications of Sumatra's fires. After a visit to North Sumatra in early July, he declared that the regions affected were "quantitatively and qualitatively" strongly pro-communist in the 1960s, and in 1978 became strong bases for "the extreme right and its 'Jihad Command'". General Murdani was right, he said, to warn that communists "could infiltrate everywhere... even in communities where religious beliefs are strong." He said 15,000 of the 21,000 hectares destroyed were small-holding plantations, much of which was owned by "certain officials" which could have made them the target of "irresponsible groups in society" (*Sinar Harapan*, 10 July).

the heavily-purged Police Force lost all its autonomy and was fully integrated into the Armed Forces, little more than a fourth, wooden leg of the Armed Forces.

In Murdani's words, the Police Force (Polri) is now to be 'de-militarised', professionalised and restored to its original function of being in charge of law and order. The shift has been evident for some time already. Thus, Polri is now forming its own death-squads to replace the Army's death-squads which murdered thousands of people in 1983 and 1984. In those days, they were the victims of 'petrus', the 'mysterious killers'. The Polri Jakarta chief has added a new term to the vocabulary of Indonesia's killer tradition with his expression, 'disukabumikan' (literally, 'sent to Sukabumi'), giving a macabre twist to the town in West Java whose name also means 'fond of the earth' (suka-bumi).

The stress on giving Polri back its autonomy with an identity of its own, suggests that Murdani expects the Force to operate more effectively not only against non-military criminals but against military-backed crime as well. Polri will also be expected to operate as an 'anti-terrorist' force in urban areas with its professionally-trained bomb-disposal units. But there are reasons to believe that Polri operations will focus primarily on regions regarded as relatively free from security disorders. Thus, according to Polri Chief, General Anton Soedjarwo, major regional police forces (Polda) will be located only in Java, South Sumatra, North Sumatra, North and South Sulawesi and Bali. This leaves out Aceh, West and East Kalimantan, Maluku, Irian Jaya and East Timor, which are precisely the regions where armed resistance exists or has existed in the past. They are the regions listed by Ginanjar Kartasasmita, chairman of the Investment Coordination Board, as the places where investment projects require security clearance from the Ministry of Defence and Security. In other words, these as the 'rawan' (disturbed) regions where law and order becomes an almost exclusively military affair.

Even in regions relatively free of major disturbances, the Army is called in when large-scale disturbances break out, as for example in Tanjung Priok last September. On such occasions, the Police cannot be trusted to implement the Army's policy and if they play a role at all, it is only 'secondary'.

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